HOW EUROPEAN MAYORS HANDLE URBAN SECURITY ISSUES? POLICE, PARTNERSHIPS AND URBAN CRIME PREVENTION

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OUTLINE

- Urban security as an issue for European Mayors
- A new urban politics of crime prevention: trends in local urban security policies... and their contradictions.
- Two examples: local security partnerships and styles policing



URBAN SECURITY AS A POLITICAL ISSUE

- •Mobilisation of local authorities around the issues of crime, incivilities and insecurity:
 - •Italy (Calaresu and Selmini, 2017; Quassoli et al., 2018; Selmini, 2005),
 - •France (de Maillard, 2005; de Maillard and Mouhanna, 2017; Ferret and Mouhanna, 2005),
 - •The Netherlands (Prins and Devroe, 2017; Van Swaaningen, 2005),
 - •England and Wales (Edwards et al., 2017b; Hughes, 2007);
 - Belgium (de Pauw and Easton, 2017).

•How?

- •Use of local police forces and administrative tools
- •Adoption of new technological devices (the most widely used being CCTV; see Welsh and Farringdon, 2009)
- Espousal of a more or less tough rhetoric, mayors
- •Sometimes challenging the traditional dominance of the central government on these issues.



WHY DO SOME LOCAL GOVERNMENTS STRESS URBAN SECURITY AS A PRIORITY ISSUE, WHEREAS OTHERS DO NOT? (KÜBLER, DE MAILLARD, 2020)

- Data on mayors' opinions and attitudes stem from a survey conducted by the POLLEADER network in 2015 and 2016 (Heinelt et al., 2018), collected via self-administered questionnaires sent to mayors of cities above 10,000 inhabitants in 28 European countries (plus Israel).
- Most important as well as second most important policy goal (and « maintain order » as a policy goal). More specifically: an index with three values (strong, intermediate, no emphasis).
- Findings: mayoral emphasis on urban security was strongly associated with mayors' position on the left–right ideological scale. Mayors leaning towards the right are more inclined to emphasize urban security as a policy goal for their city.




Figure 1. Percentage of mayors per country who indicate that public security is a policy priority for them (intermediate and strong emphasis collapsed), by region.



ANEW URBAN POLITICS OF CRIME PREVENTION

- Main trends
- Focus upon pro-active prevention rather than reactive detection;
- - Emphasis upon wider social problems, including broadly defined harms, quality of life, anti-social behaviour and disorder;
- Implementation through decentralised, local arrangements for the delivery of this politics;
- Delivery through a partnership approach, drawing together a variety of organisations and stakeholders in horizontal networks.



A NEW URBAN POLITICS OF CRIME PREVENTION

- Contradictions (Crawford, 1999, 2001, Edwards et al., 2017):
- - Wide-angled (partnership approach) but with tunnel vision (intra-organizational focus on 'outputs'; performance indicators),
- Relying on a growing demand for trust and on the institutionalization of distrust (role of procedures, new managerial rules),
- Decentralization of responsibilities vs. hands-on approach by the central state (At arm's length but also 'hands on' central government interventions),
- Nostalgia disguised as modernization (crime as a result of the breakdown of communities),
- Ambivalent political responses (combining preventive strategies and populist punitiveness).

LOCAL PARTNERSHIPS: THE EXAMPLE OF THE FRENCH OPERATIONAL PARTNERSHIP GROUPS (GPOS) AS AN ILLUSTRATION

- The operational partnership groups (GPOs) are part of the reform of the daily security police (PSQ) launched in 2018:
- Focused on "proximity sectors" (941 have been defined throughout the territory of the central public security directorate), "collective definition of concrete solutions to problems revealed and collegial evaluation of their effectiveness with representatives of the population and partners"
- Led by a sector referent, appointed from among the middle managers (inspectors) or the frontline supervisors.



LOCAL PARTNERSHIPS: A THWARTED STRATEGY OF RESPONSIBILISATION

- Hypothesis: GPOs as a tool to regain control of local partnerships, by redistributing the tasks and missions of the various partners, whether they are municipal police, social landlords or even associations.
- More than a responsibilisation imposed by the national police, it is a logic of exchange and give and take that operates.
 - The police target their patrols, carry out checks and can launch investigations, while the landlords launch security operations through situational prevention.
- Cooperation under tension:
 - Temporality: some operations of development take time, whereas the police could take short-term action by sending out patrols.
 - Resources: police officers can stress the difficulty of sending out patrols, when agendas are overloaded, while some landlords say they simply do not have the means to carry out the requested improvements.



LOCAL PARTNERSHIPS: A LIMITED REDEFINITION OF THE MODES OF POLICE ACTION

- A delegation of responsibilities for the animation of GPOs to actors who are not the heads of service (with the idea of territorial commitment).
- ... which raises questions about ranks (what is the legitimacy of the GPO chief, when he is not a senior officer, to request other services led by officers?), but also about types of specialisation (how to mobilise services for which one is not responsible?).
- As far as evaluation is concerned, the services have distinguished themselves from a purely numerical mode of evaluation by taking into account the complexity of local problems.
- Responses that borrow from the traditional repertoire (targeted patrols, controls, and more rarely investigations) of an intervention model.



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PLURAL POLICING AND STYLES OF POLICING (O'NEILL ET AL., 2022)

The enforcement turn in plural policing? A comparative analysis of public police auxiliaries in England & Wales, France and The Netherlands



- - Pluralisation of policing in the western world: role and significance of the private security industry and hybrid forms of policing with varying degrees of connectedness to the state,
- Auxiliary' police agents, that is, those policing actors who work in the public sector, either for local public municipalities or for state police agencies, but who are not the primary agents of state policing,
- - Do they distinguish themselves by ostensibly favouring community engagement and order maintenance over law enforcement? Or do they tend to align themselves on the mandates of the primary 'law and order' institution?
- Powers (right to use force, issue fines, arrest or detain), appearance (uniform, firearms, protective equipment, cars), organisational dimensions (internal organisational arrangements and units derived from the police model) and mandate (law enforcement mandate and patterns of activity derived from crime control policing).



 $\textbf{Table I.} \ \ \textbf{Features of becoming enforcement-orientated}.$

	PCSOs in E&W	Municipal police in France	MLEOs in the Netherlands
Powers	Fewer than police officers but widened in legislation in 2017. Can give fixed-penalty notices for minor offences, detain suspects for 30 min, take statements in certain situations, stop a person and ask his/ her personal details	Formalised since legislation in 1999. Apprehend suspects, powers to fine for minor offences, limited investigation powers (deputy investigation agent).	Widened since legislation in 1993: requesting IDs of citizens, limited powers to fine for 'minor' offences (e.g. parking violations, littering, public drunkenness), conduct body searches, apprehend suspects
Appearance	Uniform is similar to police officers, sometimes modified to enhance 'police-like' appearance	Growing use of firearms (not part of initial armament) and bullet-proof vests	Alter uniform to seem more 'police-like', design inspired by the British police uniform
Organisation	N/A	Internal police-like units, with a crime-fighting priority; night units	N/A
Mandate	The community engagement side of the role has diminished since 2010, law enforcement and administrative tasks increasing	A developing orientation to 'crime-fighting' such as drug trafficking in some areas	Tend to highlight law-enforcement side of the role: handcuffs and a baton are sometimes added to their equipment



CONCLUSION

- Politicisation and partnerships (Bobbio, 2003)
- Partnerships
 - A thwarted strategy of responsibilisation (and differentiated modes of action, with police commitments conditioned by those of their partners)
 - A logic based on traditional modes of action (limited problem solving, but also low diversification of partners)
- Plural policing
 - The more enforcement-like the appearance of these officers and units through current expanding equipment allocations (however different in each national context) the more this increases the risk of a growing remoteness: these officers and units are more armed and protected, but less accessible to the public.
- Thin and thick security (Loader, 2006)
 - « To be secure, as opposed to simply safe, is to be comfortable in, and with, one's environment and hence free from the burdens of recurring security work... Security, in short, is not only a matter of material risk. It has to do with the resources individuals and groups possess for managing the unease and uncertainty that the risks present in their environment generate—and these resources differ in amount according to people's sense of their place within that environment »

